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This article addresses developments in Virginia creditors' rights
from April 1988 to April 1989. It is aimed at the non-specialist who
nonetheless handles creditors' rights problems in practice. The fol-
lowing will describe the more important holdings and offer some
comments about these holdings.
I. DAMAGES FOR MALICIOUSLY FILING A MECHANICS LIEN
Donohoe Construction Co. v. Mount Vernon Associates' raised
the question of what theories will support a claim for damages
caused by the intentional wrongful filing of a mechanics' lien. The
Supreme Court of Virginia answered that the plaintiff has two the-
ories available, but the court tailored these theories so that very
few plaintiffs will ever be successful.
Defendant contractor, Donohoe, agreed to build a nursing home
for plaintiff. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) financed the construction. HUD required that the con-
struction contract contain a liquidated damages clause for late
completion and a clause granting ultimate authority to HUD to
decide all disputes involving construction and payment. Construc-
tion lagged behind schedule, and the nursing home was completed
so late that the plaintiff was compelled to cancel commitments to
patients and staff. Donohoe learned that HUD intended to enforce
the liquidated damages clause.'
Donohoe filed a memorandum of mechanics' lien for $389,576.11
four days after the project was completed, although Donohoe sub-
sequently revised the claim down to $100,899.00. In the suit to en-
force the lien, plaintiff proved it had paid all bills presented to it,
that no others were due, and that it had deposited funds with its
lender for those to come due in the future. The trial court ruled
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University; A.B., 1959, Washington & Lee Univer-
sity; LL.B., 1961, Washington & Lee University. The writer gratefully acknowledges the re-
search assistance of Mr. Donald Schultz.
1. 235 Va. 531, 369 S.E.2d 857 (1988).
2. Id. at 534, 369 S.E.2d at 859.
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that Donohoe's mechanics' lien was invalid.'
Thereafter, plaintiff sued Donohoe on two theories: that the fil-
ing of the mechanics' lien slandered its title, and that the filing
constituted an abuse of process. Plaintiff relied on the earlier
court's finding that "Donohoe knew or should have known that it
was filing its lien improperly."4 The trial court also cited evidence
that Donohoe filed the suit to prevent the assessment of liquidated
damages, to force plaintiff to settle, and delay plaintiff's closing on
permanent financing.5 The jury awarded plaintiff substantial dam-
ages. The supreme court reversed because the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support either theory.'
The court had no difficulty holding that the filing of a memoran-
dum of a mechanics' lien is a judicial proceeding entitling the
claimant to the defense of absolute privilege in a suit for slander of
title. After emphasizing that the absolute privilege applied to
words used in "all proceedings of a judicial nature,"" the court fo-
cused upon the relation of memorandum of lien to the suit to en-
force. The court held that "for a claimant to obtain the remedy
provided by [the mechanics' lien] statute," he must perfect his lien
and, thereafter, sue to enforce it. The two proceedings are insepa-
rable."9 Therefore, the filing of the memorandum of mechanics'
lien constitutes a judicial proceeding. Of course, the privilege only
applies if the words are "relevant and pertinent to the case," but
Donohoe's memorandum of lien was relevant and pertinent since
his statements followed the mandate of the Mechanics' Lien Act."0
In sum, the court tells us that a slander of title action will never lie
against a mechanics' lienor who has enough sense to follow the
forms provided in the act."
3. Id. at 535-36, 369 S.E.2d at 859-60. The plaintiff recovered $19,723.20 on its cross bill
for delay.
4. Id. at 536, 369 S.E.2d at 860.
5. Id. Plaintiff financed the construction of its nursing home through two lenders. The
"construction lender," HUD, financed the building of the project at a reduced financing rate
and an enhanced loan term. Id. at 533-34, 369 S.E.2d at 858. Once the project was com-
pleted satisfactorily, a "permanent lender" had agreed to purchase the debt and the security
from HUD. A permanent lender charges a lower interest rate to the owner than a construc-
tion lender. Thus, the owner ordinarily wants to obtain permanent financing as soon as
possible.
6. See Donohoe, 235 Va. at 539-41, 369 S.E.2d at 861-63.
7. Id. at 537, 369 S.E.2d at 860.
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1 to -23.2 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
9. 235 Va. at 539, 369 S.E.2d at 861 (emphasis in original).
10. Id. at 539, 369 S.E.2d at 861.
11. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-5, -8, -10 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
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The second issue, whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's finding of abuse of process, raised a
more difficult question. To win on an abuse of process theory,
plaintiff must prove two elements: an ulterior purpose besides that
which the procedure was designed to accomplish, and an act in the
use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the pro-
ceedings. 12 Plaintiff offered sufficient evidence of an ulterior pur-
pose - that the mechanics' lien was filed to avoid imposition of
the liquidated damages clause or to force a settlement. However,
plaintiff's evidence failed to prove that Donohoe committed any
act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of
the mechanics' lien procedure. Despite clear proof of an improper
motive, plaintiff failed to demonstrate an abuse of the process af-
ter it was issued.13
The court indicated, however, that plaintiff's proof might have
supported a claim for a kindred, but distinctly different cause of
action, known as malicious prosecution (malicious use of civil pro-
cess) 4 if it could have established "special injury."' 5 Malicious
prosecution differs from abuse of process in that the former lies
"for 'maliciously causing process to issue,' . . . while abuse of pro-
cess 'lies for the improper use of process after it has been is-
sued.' "16 As indicated above, plaintiff offered sufficient proof that
Donohoe wrongfully had process issued.' 7 To win under this the-
ory, however, a plaintiff must prove in addition either arrest of his
person arising out of the civil action, seizure of property, or "spe-
cial injury."' 8 "Special injury" is a term of art, but the word "spe-
12. 235 Va. at 539-40, 369 S.E.2d at 862; see generally 1 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 4.9 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER] (discussing abuse of process);
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
121 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER] (same).
13. 235 Va. at 541, 369 S.E.2d at 862.
14. A malicious prosecution suit most commonly is founded upon an underlying criminal
proceeding instituted with malice and without probable cause, which terminated in favor of
the plaintiff. Pallas v. Zaharopoulos, 219 Va. 751, 250 S.E.2d 357 (1979). A majority of juris-
dictions have extended this cause of action to include malicious (wrongful) initiation of civil
suits. See HARPER, supra note 12, at §§ 4.1 -4.9; PROSSER, supra note 12, at §§ 119-121.
15. 235 Va. at 541, 369 S.E.2d at 863. The court intimates that plaintiff's counsel mistak-
enly chose the wrong theory, and that the questionable result it reaches is not inevitable if
counsel chooses the right theory. This appears to be an attempt to pass the buck. As the
text accompanying notes 16-28 indicates, plaintiff could not have proved "special injury."
The responsibility for the Donohoe result rests with the court.
16. Id. at 540, 369 S.E.2d at 862 (quoting Glidewell v. Murray-Lacy & Co., 124 Va. 563,
567-68, 98 S.E. 665, 667-68 (1919)).
17. See supra text accompanying note 13.
18. Virginia and a sizeable minority of American states follow the rule that "the malicious
1989] 563
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cial" obscures rather than explains the concept.19 Special injury in-
cludes only damages which ordinarily do not stem from suits of the
kind filed. Ayyildiz v. Kidd2 ° illustrates this concept. After plain-
tiff doctor successfully defended a malpractice suit, he brought a
malicious prosecution action against his patient, alleging as dam-
ages expenditures to defend the original lawsuit, loss of present
and future earnings and profits in the practice of medicine, and
injury to his professional reputation. The supreme court held that
because all such damages would ordinarily arise in a medical mal-
practice suit, plaintiff failed to satisfy the special injury require-
ment.2' Rather, plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant's suit
caused an injury not normally flowing from such lawsuits, or that
plaintiff was peculiarly subject to a unique kind of injury. For in-
stance, if Doctor Ayyildiz had been engaged in a new medical spe-
cialty, which required him to convince the public of the new tech-
nique's merit, and the defendant obtained a temporary injunction
preventing Ayyildiz from practicing medicine for the purpose of
destroying his present doctor-patient relationships, plaintiff might
be able to demonstrate special injury because he was uniquely sub-
ject to such harm.2
prosecution doctrine is not extended to a civil proceeding, even though this proceeding is
instituted for an improper purpose and without probable cause, unless there is an arrest of
the defendant in that civil action, seizure of his property, or some other special injury to
him." Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 1083, 266 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1980). Such rule is justified
by the need to protect losing plaintiffs from retaliatory lawsuits. The rule and its justifica-
tion have been harshly criticized. See HARPER, supra note 12, at § 4.8; PROSSER, supra note
12, at § 120. The authors argue that the so called English rule is a distortion of the actual
English view and would not be followed in England on the same facts. HARPER, supra note
12, at § 4.8, at 470-74.
19. The Supreme Court of Virginia's definition of special damages is not helpful. An Ore-
gon case, O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977) far better describes the
concept.
20. 220 Va. 1080, 266 S.E.2d 108 (1980).
21. The plaintiff here has suffered no injury that would not stem normally from a medi-
cal malpractice suit. A defendant in such a suit usually pays his costs and attorney's
fees. The damage to the professional reputation of a physician who prevails in mal-
practice litigation is debatable; but in any event such damages as may result are com-
mon to all malpractice actions. Moreover, plaintiff's allegations of injury to his pro-
fessional reputation and good name are conclusory with no facts being alleged to
support a special injury. The other "special injury" alleged, concerning loss of present
and future income, we have observed would fall upon the defending physician in any
medical malpractice action.
Id. at 1084-85, 266 S.E.2d at 112.
22. But cf. id. As Ayyildiz indicates, the special injury requirement precludes virtually all
efforts by physicians to countersue those who instigate baseless malpractice suits. See gen-
erally Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjusti-
fied Medical Malpractice Action, 45 FORDHAm L. REv. 1003 (1977) (overview of phenome-
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As noted above, the court in Donohoe suggested the plaintiff
could have successfully sued for malicious prosecution had it
proved special injury. One wonders what kind of harm plaintiff
might have alleged. Allegations that the filing of the mechanics'
lien 23 prevented a sale or a rental, or increased costs due to the
fear of non-payment by materialmen, subcontractors, or laborers
would not qualify as a special injury. Possibly, proof that the
mechanics' lien interfered with other relations, such as loss of pa-
tient commitments or staff, and that Donohoe knew of plaintiff's
vulnerability might suffice. If the delay caused by the lien dis-
rupted plaintiff's financial arrangements with its permanent
lender, special damages may exist.24 One cannot be sure.
One assumes the court's suggestion that plaintiff might have
stated a cause of action for malicious prosecution was designed to
provide leeway for the court in the future. However, such leeway
may be very limited. A mechanic whose attorney knew the rules
could file "maliciously" while avoiding the risks.2 5 In any jurisdic-
tion adopting the special injury requirement, "[t]here is almost no
possibility of a malicious prosecution remedy for unjustified initia-
non). In the hypothetical suggested in the text, defendant's malicious effort to obtain an
injunction could be regarded as a sufficient interference with plaintiff's person to sustain a
malicious prosecution action even by courts following the "English" common law rule. See,
e.g., Bank of Lyons v. Schultz, 78 Ill. 2d 235, 399 N.E.2d 1286 (1980).
23, In Ailstock v. Moore Lime Co., 104 Va. 565, 52 S.E. 213 (1905), it was held that the
groundless suing of an attachment of a debt owed by a third party to plaintiff was a seizure
of property for which a malicious prosecution will lie. In such action any damages plaintiff
suffers may be recovered. The filing of a mechanics' lien, however, ordinarily is not regarded
as a seizure of property because the owner is not dispossessed; yet according to the Donohoe
court, a plaintiff may maintain an action for malicious prosecution of a mechanics' lien if
that plaintiff establishes special injury. Donohoe, 235 Va. at 541, 369 S.E.2d at 862-63. Such
a suit would probably fail because some interference with the plaintiff's property rights is a
common burden in all mechanics' lien cases, and therefore would not constitute a special
injury. Cf. Ayyildiz, 220 Va. at 1084-85, 266 S.E.2d at 111-12 (special injury absent where
plaintiff doctor suffered no injury that would not arise normally from a medical malpractice
suit).
24. One of the alleged reasons for Donohoe's filing of the mechanics' lien was that such a
lien would prevent closing on permanent financing. Donohoe, 235 Va. at 536, 369 S.E.2d at
860. Although the existence of a construction lender and a permanent lender is common in
the construction industry, Donohoe's filing may have caused plaintiff to lose its permanent
lender rather than merely increase its interest costs.
25. A plaintiff suing for malicious prosecution of a mechanics' lien suit could sue the at-
torney who filed the original suit only if he alleged special injury. Ayyildiz, 220 Va. at 1084,
266 S.E.2d at 111. However, an attorney may be subject to disciplinary action by the Vir-
ginia State Bar for bringing a frivolous lawsuit. See VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBn-
rry DR 7-102(A)(1) (1989) (prohibiting a lawyer from filing a suit "when it is obvious that
such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another").
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tion of civil litigation that would result, if successful, only in a
judgment debt.
'26
II. PERFECTING A MECHANICS' LIEN AGAINST THE OWNER 27
Virginia courts demand strict compliance with the Mechanics'
Lien Act before a lien arises. 28 The smallest deviation from the
statutory requirements is often fatal. To perfect a lien, the
mechanic must file a memorandum of lien 29 and bring a suit to
enforce the lien in accordance with the statute.30 The owner of the
property to be charged must be named in both the memorandum
of lien and suit to enforce. In both instances, the mechanics' lien
may be enforced against the property only to the extent of the in-
terest of the person named as owner.3 ' Thus, for example, if the
person named as owner holds only a leasehold interest, the lien
attaches to the leasehold only.32 Set out below are two examples of
how this rule operates to defeat a mechanics' lien.
In Virginia, spouses commonly hold title to property as tenants
by the entirety. Property held as a tenancy by the entirety is sub-
ject only to the claims of a joint creditor of both husband and
wife.3 Thus, if the mechanic files a memorandum of lien against
only the husband on property held by the spouses as tenants by
the entirety, the lien fails. The fact that the wife knew that lien
was claimed against the property and that she signed the contract
for the improvements does not change the result. The mechanic
must check the title to the property and understand the legal im-
plications of what he discovers. 3
4
A mechanic must check the land records a second time to deter-
mine who holds title to the property on the date the suit to enforce
26. HARPER, supra note 12, at § 4.8, at 467-68.
27. See generally J. ULRICH, VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN'S
LIENS §§ 2-4, -6, -13 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
28. Coleman v. Pearman, 159 Va. 72, 165 S.E. 361 (1932).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1986) sets forth the requirements for the memoran-
dum of lien, and VA. CODE ANN. § 43-5 (Repl. Vol. 1986) sets forth a legislatively approved
form. Use of the form prevents many mistakes, but not the one discussed here.
30. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-17, -22 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
31. See Feuchtenberger v. Williamson, Carroll & Saunders, 137 Va. 578, 583-88, 120 S.E.
257, 259-60 (1923) (construing predecessors of VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-3, -20 (Repl. Vol. 1986)).
32. Wallace v. Brumback, 177 Va. 36, 12 S.E.2d 801 (1941). The leasehold will seldom be
worth much.
33. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951).
34. Gunther v. Cantrell, 11 Va. Cir. 255 (1988).
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is filed. This is necessary because a mechanics' lien may be en-
forced only against the party who owned the property at the time
the suit to enforce the lien was instituted.3 5 For example, suppose
General Contractor (G) contracts with Owner (0) for improve-
ments on Blackacre. G subcontracts part of the work to S. 0 enters
into another contract for improvements on Blackacre with K. After
G completes the project, G files a memorandum of lien naming 0
as owner and brings a suit to enforce against 0. Thereafter, S and
K each file a memorandum of lien naming 0 as owner. 0 sells
Blackacre to Buyer B, who properly records the deed.30 Subse-
quently, S and K intervene3 7 in G's suit to enforce naming 0, but
not B, as owner. Assuming all else is proper, G obtains a lien en-
forceable against B, but S38 and K do not because they failed to
name B, who owned Blackacre when the suit was filed.
A. Remedies in Fraudulent Conveyance Cases
In re Jenkins Landscaping & Excavating, Inc. 9 involved the
following facts. Corporation JLE, acting under the direction of its
controlling stockholder, J, transferred all of its assets to another of
J's corporations, X, for the purpose of defrauding creditor C. At
J's direction, X paid both a debt and a dividend to J out of JLE's
assets. More than a year after the transfer, C recovered a judgment
against JLE, which immediately filed bankruptcy. The bankruptcy
court voided the transfer from JLE to J under section 55-80 of the
Code of Virginia,40 returning these assets to JLE's bankruptcy es-
tate.4' C and J were JLE's only creditors, but JLE had insufficient
35. Burton Lumber Corp. v. Davis Constr. & Dev. Corp., 14 Va. Cir. 503 (1983).
36. Mechanics may rely on the record. A purchaser under an unrecorded contract or deed
is not an owner for the purposes of the mechanics' lien statutes. R. C. Lee Carpet & Tile,
Inc. v. Cone Constr. Corp., 12 Va. Cir. 159 (1988).
37. On the effect of intervention and S & K's alternatives, see J. ULRICH, supra note 27, at
§ 2-13 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
38. Even though S does not obtain his own lien, S may take advantage of G's lien pursu-
ant to VA. CODE ANN. § 43-18 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
39. 93 Bankr. 84 (W.D. Va. 1988).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 1986) becomes applicable in bankruptcy through
use of 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), which permits the trustee to avoid any transfer of an interest in
the debtor's property that would be avoidable under non-bankruptcy law by an unsecured
creditor with a claim against the estate. The trustee could not use the bankruptcy code's
fraudulent conveyance section, because the JLE-to-X transfer occurred more than a year
before bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988).
41. All transfers voided and property recovered by the trustee under section 544(b) be-
come part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(3), 550(a) (1988).
1989]
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assets to pay both.42
Is C entitled to priority over J as to JLE's assets? The bank-
ruptcy court granted C priority43 on the common sense ground that
J, the perpetrator of actual fraud, should not be allowed to share
in the recovered funds with his victim, C. The bankruptcy court
distinguished Mills v. Miller Harness Co. 44 which held that where
a preference paid to the controlling director by a liquidating corpo-
ration is set aside under section 55-80 of the Code of Virginia, all
creditors, including the preferred director, are entitled to a pro
rata share of the recovered assets. Judge Krum viewed Mills as
involving only fraud presumed in law, while J acted with actual
fraudulent intent. The district court reversed, asserting that the
Supreme Court of Virginia had given no indication it would accept
such a distinction. Conceding that allowing J to share with C was
"more than passing strange," Judge Michael nevertheless felt com-
pelled to order this result under the controlling Virginia
authority.46
The strange result in Jenkins builds on decisions such as Mills
that confuse fraudulent conveyances and preferences. Virginia fol-
lows the common law rule that a preference is valid, and a creditor
may knowingly accept it. 46 The only exception to this rule comes
from cases like Mills holding that a director in control of a liqui-
dating corporation may not prefer himself. On Mills' facts, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia has consistently characterized the prefer-
ential payment to the controlling director as a fraudulent
conveyance, 47 asserting that the transferee acted with actual fraud-
ulent intent.48 While the result in Mills seems clearly correct,49 the
42. 93 Bankr. at 85.
43. In Jenkins the precise question was whether J's fraud precluded him from filing a
proof of claim pursuant to BANKR. RULE 3002(c)(3), which permits creditors who received
voidable transfers to file proofs of claim within 30 days after the judgment avoiding such
transfer has become final. The bankruptcy court did not let J file. 93 Bankr. at 89.
44. 229 Va. 155, 326 S.E.2d 665 (1985); see also Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply
Co., 234 Va. 207, 360 S.E.2d 828 (1987); Darden v. George C. Lee Co., 204 Va. 108, 129
S.E.2d 897 (1963).
45. In re Jenkins, 93 Bankr. at 87, 89.
46. Surratt v. Eskridge, 131 Va. 325, 108 S.E. 677 (1921).
47. See cases cited supra note 44. With the exception indicated, a corporation may prefer
one creditor over another. Beck v. Semones Adm'r, 145 Va. 429, 134 S.E. 677 (1926); see also
infra note 52.
48. Section 55-80 of the Code of Virginia voids all transfers made with the intent to de-
fraud creditors. A fraudulent transfer may not be set aside, however, unless the transferee
qualifies as bona fide purchaser. One who knowingly accepts a preference does no wrong
under section 55-80 of the Code of Virginia. See Irby v. Gardner, 157 Va. 132, 160 S.E. 81
568 [Vol. 23:561
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court has never adequately explained how the controlling director's
intent differed from that of an ordinary preferee5 Once the assets
have been returned to the corporation, Mills holds that the direc-
tor may share ratably with other creditors. Such a remedy is ap-
propriate for preferences, which offend, if at all, the collective in-
terests of creditors, but such remedy makes no sense where the
transferee is a party to a fraud of those with whom he is permitted
to share. Presumably, the Mills court did not view the director's
conduct as morally evil, but merely refused to let him use his in-
side position5 to gain an advantage over those with equal claims.
Jenkins involved more than a preference. The bankruptcy court
found the controlling stockholder guilty of an actual intent to de-
fraud the creditor, and on this point the district court affirmed.
Thus, the bankruptcy judge's decision to distinguish Mills as in-
volving only technical fraud (presumed in law rather than actual)
seems sensible. On the other hand, a literal reading of the Virginia
cases does not support this distinction. The problem, of course,
does not lie with either view. Jenkins simply exposes the Virginia
court's inept scheme for dealing with corporate manipulations di-
rected by insiders to gain advantages over outside creditors.52
(1931). Thus, the preferred director's conduct in Jenkins had to be characterized as fraudu-
lent for section 55-80 of the code of Virginia to apply.
49. Fletcher cites numerous decisions upsetting corporate preferences to or for the benefit
of a controlling director. 15A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 7421 (Rev. Perm. ed. 1973). Most of the decisions rest on the theory that the con-
trolling director, by taking the preference, violates a fiduciary duty to other creditors of the
corporation. This rule is not a part of the law of fraudulent conveyances. In bankruptcy
such transfers would be subject to challenge as insider preferences. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)
(1988).
50. This point is considered at length in Ulrich, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences
in Virginia, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 51, 65-77 (1979).
51. "[A fraudulent conveyance] is inherently and always vicious; the [preference] inno-
cent and valid, except when made in violation of the express provision of a statute. One is
malum per se and the other malum prohibitum -- and then only to the extent forbidden."
Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913).
52. At one time Virginia permitted a controlling director to receive preferential payments
from his corporation. Planters Bank of Farmville v. Whittle, 78 Va. 737 (1884). But see
cases cited supra note 44 overruling Planters Bank. Yet in Bank of Commerce v. Rosemary
& Thyme, Inc., 218 Va. 781, 239 S.E.2d 909 (1978), the question was whether preferential
payments made by a corporation to a third party for which the controlling directors were
sureties fell within the scope of these cases. Despite the fact that the controlling directors'
economic positions in Bank of Commerce and Mills are functionally identical, the court held
that the plaintiff was not entitled to a remedy against the directors under section 55-80 of
the Code of Virginia. 218 Va. at 787-89, 239 S.E.2d at 914-15. Of course, the directors in
Bank of Commerce did not receive a transfer. The problem stems from the court's labelling
a preference as a fraudulent conveyance in Mills. This has misled the bar. The law would be
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Arguably, the Bankruptcy Code resolves the priority problem
raised in Jenkins.5 3 Section 55-80 of the Code of Virginia becomes
applicable through one of the trustee's powers, section 544(b)
54 of
the Bankruptcy Code. The judges and attorneys involved in Jen-
kins assumed that section 544(b) incorporates the entire state law
result. The Bankruptcy Code, however, seems to require a different
result. Section 541(a)(3)5" provides that "[a]ny interest in property
that the trustee recovers under Section . . . 550" becomes part of
the estate. Section 550(a) 51 provides that "to the extent that a
transfer is avoided under section 544" the trustee may recover the
property or its value from the initial transferee. Therefore, once
the transfer to J from JLE was set aside, the assets became part of
the estate. The Bankruptcy Code decides how the assets of the es-
tate should be distributed. In this setting, the bankruptcy court
could have subordinated J's claim to C's under section 510(c)(1)
using traditional equitable principles.
5 7
III. VIRGINIA EXEMPTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Interpreting the Virginia Exemption Statutes
Every bankrupt claims his or her exemptions. Exemptions are a
crucial part of a bankrupt's fresh economic start. Of course, bank-
rupts assert the maximum exemption, and in the process exemp-
tion claims are often pushed to the statutory limit. Because Vir-
ginia has "opted out" of the federal exemptions, Virginia
bankrupts may use only Virginia exemptions.58 Thus federal
judges, especially bankruptcy judges, must decide the outer limits
of the Virginia exemption system. This year was no exception.
In Virginia, only a householder may claim the homestead,59 poor
improved if the Supreme Court of Virginia would look to the body of law developed by the
Fourth Circuit in this area. See, e.g., Regal Ware, Inc. v. Fidelity Corp., 550 F.2d 934 (4th
Cir. 1977); Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1945); Certain-Teed v. Wallinger, 89 F.2d
42 (4th Cir. 1937).
53. Doug Rendleman, a fellow law professor at Washington and Lee, suggested this
theory.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988).
55. Id. § 541(a)(3).
56. Id. § 550(a).
57. Id. § 510(c)(1).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)(a) authorizes a state to limit its residents to local exemptions by
opting out of the federal exemption. Virginia has opted out. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (Rep.
Vol. 1984).
59. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1 to -25 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989). Despite its name,
[Vol. 23:561
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debtor's, 0 and insurance6 1 exemptions. Section 34-1 of the Code of
Virginia defines householder to include "any person, married or
unmarried, who maintains a separate residence or living quarters,
whether or not others are living with him." The definition tells us
that a householder need not have dependants6 2 Otherwise, the
definition is remarkably unhelpful.6 3 The federal courts have been
forced to refine this definition.
May a person who lives with his parents and earns no separate
income qualify as a householder? Judge Hoffman in Jones v.
Kirsch64 answered "no," essentially on the ground that to allow
this debtor householder status would write the limitation out of
the statute. The existence of the definition in section 34-1 of the
Code of Virginia strongly implies that the legislature did not in-
tend to extend the homestead exemption to all debtors. 5
Jones moves toward a workable definition of householder.
Debtor Kirsch was the archetypical non-householder, a person liv-
ing with those who support him. Had Kirsch lived in his own
apartment, he apparently would have qualified as a householder
because, although dependent, he maintained a residence separate
from his parents who supported him; the definition of householder
emphasizes living apart, not earning an income.66 However, sup-
pose Kirsch earned an income and contributed to his own support
while living at home. Arguably, contributing to one's support may
be enough to obtain householder status. Certainly, this debtor
the homestead is a pure exemption in the amount of $5,000.
60. VA. CODE ANN. §34-26 (Repl. Vol. 1984). Section 34-27 of the Code of Virginia grants
an additional exemption for those engaged in agriculture.
61. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-3122 to -3125 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Repl. Vol. 1984). Before 1979 only debtors with a legal or moral
obligation to support dependents qualified as householders. See M. BURKS, PLEADING AND
PRACTICE IN ACTIONS AT COMMON LAW §§ 440-42 (4th ed. 1952). The reasons for the change
in definition are discussed in Ulrich, The Virginia Exemption Statutes - The Need for
Reform and a Proposed Revision, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 127, 131-33 (1980); see also In re
Doan, 11 Bankr. 704, 705-06 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981) (discussing deletion of dependents
requirement).
63. Judge Shelley described it as "vague and ambiguous." In re Marsh, 26 Bankr. 94, 95
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982).
64. 93 Bankr. 77 (E.D. Va. 1988).
65. Id. at 81.
66. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Repl. Vol. 1984). Judge Hoffman stressed that section 34-1
focused on the householder's living in a separate residence, and that Kirsch lived with his
parents, not they with him. 93 Bankr. at 79-80. The Fourth Circuit of the Code of Virginia
in Chesseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 1981) indicated in dictum that a young
couple living together "but apart from either set of parents" would be householders.
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could cite the Virginia bankruptcy cases allowing both spouses
householder status where each contributes to the support of the
family unit. 7 If this analysis is correct, non-householders are a
small, easily recognizable class.
In comparison with certain western states, Virginia grants parsi-
monious exemptions. The generosity' of the federal exemptions
served as the primary reason for the legislative decision to opt out.
The Virginia homestead and insurance exemptions have lower dol-
lar values than the federal, and the items enumerated in the poor
debtor's exemption - clothes, necessary beds and bedding, many
common household and kitchen articles, one horse, etc. - ordina-
rily will not be valuable to creditors at a sale. 8 Note, however, that
there is no dollar limit on such items.
Suppose a bankrupt claims a $640,000 racehorse as his poor
debtor's horse. May he keep the horse, or is a $640,000 horse "too
valuable" to come within the letter and spirit of the exemption.
Judge Shelley held for the bankrupt in In re Freedlander69 on the
ground that the Virginia legislature, "clearly and unambiguously,"
had entitled a householder to exempt one horse. He emphasized
that the $100.00 cap on the value of an exemptible horse was re-
moved in 1876, and the legislature had not seen fit to restore it.7"
To hold otherwise would require the court to overrule the legisla-
tive wisdom on this matter.
Would Freedlander have come out differently if the debtor had
purchased the $640,000 horse with non-exempt assets on the eve of
bankruptcy for the purpose of claiming it as exempt? Judge Shel-
ley stressed that this problem was not before him.7 ' Rather, this
bankrupt had been sufficiently well heeled to buy this luxury
before he fell on hard times, and his lucky choice fortuitously pro-
vided him a fresher start than most debtors. Judge Shelly sug-
67. Where each spouse contributes to the maintenance of the household, both spouses are
entitled to claim exemptions. Roberts v. County of Henrico Fed. Credit Union, 709 F.2d 275
(4th Cir. 1983); Chesseman, 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981); In re Gustinis, 16 Bankr. 108
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981).
68. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Repl. Vol. 1984). Because such items are worth more to
the debtor than anyone else, professional creditors often threaten to enforce liens on them
to coerce the debtor into payment.
69. 93 Bankr. 446 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988). Had the debtor demonstrated he was a farmer,
he would have been entitled to claim a second "too valuable" horse as exempt under the
"poor farmer's" exemption. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-27 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
70. 93 Bankr. at 450 n.2
71. Id. at 448.
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gested, however, that if Freedlander had engaged in bankruptcy
planning, that is, purchased the horse at the time he was contem-
plating bankruptcy, not only would this claim of exemption fail
but the debtor might lose his discharge. 2 Thus, before one coun-
sels a sinking client to get his bankruptcy house in order by
purchasing a Guttenberg Bible, fine oriental rugs, or a racehorse,
remember that the stakes are high and the outcome totally
unpredictable.
B. Incorporating the Virginia Exemptions into Bankruptcy
73
In re Snow7 4 raises a crucial issue: Is the entire Virginia exemp-
tion system incorporated into bankruptcy? After Green recovered
a judgment against Snow for rent and levied on certain items of
personal property, Snow filed a homestead deed claiming such
72. See id. Converting non-exempt property into exempt property on the eve of bank-
ruptcy offends judicial sensibilities despite Congress' statement that the "practice is not
fraudulent as to creditors, and permits the debtor to make full use of the exemption to
which he is entitled under law." S. REP. No. 989, 95 Cong., 2d Sess. 76, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5862; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6317. In Ford v. Poston, 773 F.2d
52 (4th Cir. 1985), the court held that whether the debtor's conversion of non-exempt to
exempt property demonstrated an intent to defraud creditors so as to preclude a discharge
under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) presented a factual question for the bankruptcy court. When a
debtor claims property as exempt, he necessarily intends to deny creditors the right to use
such property to satisfy their claims. Exemptions can be viewed as legalized frauds on credi-
tors. When a failing debtor uses assets to buy a race horse to claim as exempt under VA.
CODE ANN. § 34-26, his intent is to put it beyond creditors' reach. Ford v. Poston does not
indicate what facts demonstrate actual fraud. Rather, it focuses on the debtor's subjective
intent to fraudulently prevent creditors from using this property. Thus, conversions from
non-exempt to exempt become risky.
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-17 (Cum. Supp. 1989), sets forth the time limit for claiming the
homestead. A voluntary bankrupt must file a homestead deed before six days after the first
creditors meeting, an event which should occur between 20 and 40 days after the petition,
according to BANKE. R 2003(a). Two recent cases flesh out the meaning of section 34-17 of
the Code of Virginia.
Suppose debtor files a Chapter 13 that is subsequently converted to a Chapter 7. May the
debtor claim a homestead after the conversion? In re Freedlander, 93 Bankr. 446 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1988), indicates that the answer generally will be no. If the first creditors meeting
occurred after the original filing, no homestead may be filed more than five days after the
meeting. The conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 does not constitute a new or sepa-
rate case even if a second first creditor's meeting is convened. Id. at 448-49. Suppose debtor
merely wishes to increase the amount of his homestead claim after the section 34-17 period
has run. While ordinarily new property may not be added or the value of the exemption
increased more than five days after the first creditors' meeting, this general rule does not
apply to property that did not belong to debtor at the time the exemption had to be as-
serted. In re Custis, 87 Bankr. 415 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
74. 92 Bankr. 154 (W.D. Va. 1988), rev'g 71 Bankr. 186 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987). In re
Godfrey, 93 Bankr. 451 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) reaches the same result.
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items exempt. Subsequently, Snow filed bankruptcy. 5 Pointing to
section 34-5(5) of the Code of Virginia,76 which provides that the
homestead cannot be claimed against a debt for rent, Green as-
serted that his lien was not affected by Snow's homestead claim or
bankruptcy petition. Conceding that Green's position would be
correct outside of bankruptcy, Snow argued that section 522(f)(1)
7 7
of the Bankruptcy Code, which voids liens that impair an exemp-
tion, overrode the section 34-5(5) exceptions and could be used to
avoid Green's lien. Green responded that the Bankruptcy Code in-
corporates the state exemption scheme in its entirety, that section
34-5(5) means that debtor Snow acquires no homestead exemption
as against rent claimant Green, and thus, no exemption existed on
which section 522(f)(1) could operate. The district court agreed
with Green. The court's metaphor comparing the homestead to a
wedge of Swiss cheese captures the essence of the holding:
Just as the entirety of the wedge is composed of both the cheese and
the holes, the entirety of the Virginia homestead exemption is com-
posed both of the substantive provision allowing a debtor to exempt
certain property and the exceptions to that exemption which, in this
court's metaphor, constitute the holes. Properly understood, the
holes are a part of the wedge of cheese and one takes that wedge
subject to the holes.7 18
In sum, the debtor receives only what the state exemption system
gives him, and bankruptcy provisions, such as section 522(f) do not
change this.
Snow is not an example of a hard case making bad law; rather, it
is an example of a "poorly crafted legislative scheme" mandating a
poor result.
79
C. Dischargeability of Debts
Individuals file for bankruptcy to obtain a discharge of pre-peti-
tion debts. The discharge, in conjunction with exemptions, consti-
tutes the bankruptcy fresh start. Not all debts are dischargeable.
75. In re Snow, 92 Bankr. at 155.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-5(5) (Rep. Vol. 1984).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
78. In re Snow, 92 Bankr. at 158.
79. Id. at 161 (quoting Dominion Bank of Cumberland v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408, 414-417
(4th Cir. 1985) (Hoffman, J., concurring)). Judge Hoffman cogently states the case against
the current bankruptcy exemption scheme.
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The Bankruptcy Code lists ten categories of obligations that sur-
vive a discharge."0 Although dischargeability issues present federal
questions, state law often has an important role to play.
Section 523(a)(5) of the Code of Virginia provides that obliga-
tions for alimony or child support arising out of a separation agree-
ment or a court decree are not dischargeable, but obligations aris-
ing from a property settlement are dischargeable."' Often, the
separation agreement or court decree fails to make clear whether
an obligation is for alimony or part of a property settlement. How
the parties label the debt is not determinative. Rather, the bank-
ruptcy court must decide its character for discharge purposes.2 In
re West83 well illustrates the difficulty of the characterization
problem.
In a hotly contested divorce case, the divorce court ordered the
husband to pay all of the couple's joint obligations and the wife's
attorneys' fees but denied the wife "spousal support. 's4 The record
also contained the court's observation that the husband could not
afford to pay more. 5 At the dischargeability hearing, the question
was whether the husband's obligations were dischargeable. The
task of the bankruptcy court at the dischargeability hearing is to
determine whether the trier of fact intended such obligations as
alimony or as part of a property settlement.8 6 If there had been no
more evidence available in West, the bankruptcy court would have
found the obligations dischargeable, because the order denying
"spousal support" and the finding that the husband could not pay
support strongly implied that the husband's obligations were part
of a property settlement and not in lieu of alimony.
8 7
80. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988).
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
82. Because divorce so often leads to bankruptcy - "a clean up bankruptcy" - this kind
of dischargeability problem should be anticipated.
83. 95 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); see also In re Corrigan, 93 Bankr. 81 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1988), which sets forth Judge Bonney's approach.
84. "Adjudged, Ordered, and Decreed that the Defendant's request for spousal support is
hereby denied on the basis of insufficient funds on the part of the Complainant." 95 Bankr.
at 396. The decree was drafted by counsel for the plaintiff. Id.
85. See id. at 397.
86. Id. at 398-99 (citing In re Long, 794 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1986)). If a property settlement
is involved, the intent of the parties on the dischargeability question as expressed in the
agreement must control. See id. at 398 (citing Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir.
1986)).
87. Generally, the plaintiff has the burden of proof in dischargeability cases. BANKR. R.
4007; In re West, 95 Bankr. at 398.
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The parties did offer more evidence. Indeed, they stipulated that
the divorce court's order was based on the assumption that the
husband's obligations were non-dischargeable, and that had the
judge understood the bankruptcy implications, his order would
have denied the wife "additional spousal support."88 This stipula-
tion resolved the dischargeability issue. Although the judge's opin-
ion that dischargeability is a federal question was irrelevant, the
phrase "additional spousal support" clearly implies the obligations
imposed were in lieu of alimony.8 9
In re West accents the need for attorneys in divorce matters to
draft the separation agreement or the court decree carefully so
that the potential dischargeability question does not arise. Despite
this admonition, it is difficult to state concrete rules on how to ac-
complish this goal. For example, when payments terminate with
death or remarriage, when the debt is one for alimony, but if the
payments continue after death, they are part of the property set-
tlement. This much is clear.90 In a situation like West, in which the
husband is ordered to pay joint obligations, the decree itself should
resolve the dischargeability question. West is helpful in this re-
gard. While labels can never control, the attorney, especially the
wife's attorney, must build a record showing why the debt took
this particular form and was intended as alimony.91
Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code declares that defalca-
tions by fiduciaries create non-dischargeable debts.92 Quite often
the issue under this section turns on the definition of a fiduciary.
For example, is a partner a fiduciary? Section 50-21 of the Code of
Virginia9" provides that a partner owes fiduciary duties to the part-
nership. In re Lewis94 holds, however, that the definition of fiduci-
88. The trial judge speculated that the pertinent part of the decree should have read
"Adjudged, Ordered, and Decreed that the Defendant's request for additional spousal sup-
port is hereby denied on the basis of insufficient funds on the part of the Complainant." In
re West, 95 Bankr. at 397.
89. Judge Bostetter's reasoning in Snow is instructive. See id. at 400.
90. See, e.g., In re Carrig, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 446 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981). Be-
yond this case, the outcome is unpredictable. 4 Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide 76.08
(1986). For example, attorney fees are often considered alimony, but not always. Compare
In re Spong, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1104 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 5 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 242 (2d Cir. 1981) with In re Chrisman, 6 Bankr. 339 (W.D. Okla.
1978).
91. See, e.g., In re West, 95 Bankr. at 398-400.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988).
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-21 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
94. 94 Bankr. 406 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
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ary presents a federal question, and that partners are not fiducia-
ries for section 523(a)(4) purposes despite the Virginia statute. In
re Lewis narrowly defines fiduciary to include only "trustees of
specific written declaration of trust, guardians, administrators, ex-
ecutors, or public officers and, absent special considerations, does
not extend to the more general class of fiduciaries such as agents,
bailees, brokers, factors and partners.
9 5
Sections 524(c) and (d) limit a debtor's capacity to reaffirm pre-
petition debts.96 These limitations were imposed to safeguard the
debtor's fresh start. Reaffirmations convert dischargeable debts
into non-dischargeable debts. If the debtor reaffirms too many pre-
petition obligations, his discharge will be of little value. To protect
the debtor against himself, sections 524(c) and (d) mandate that
the debtor's attorney and the bankruptcy judge oversee the deci-
sion to reaffirm. Unless these procedures are followed, the debt re-
mains dischargeable despite a post- petition agreement to repay.9
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit emphasized this
last point in Arnhold v. Kyrus9 After filing his bankruptcy peti-
tion, debtor signed a new note and made several payments to cred-
itor. At the discharge hearing, however, debtor did not mention the
new note, and the court did not approve the reaffirmation. Subse-
quently, debtor defaulted on the new note. When creditor sued in
state court, debtor asked the bankruptcy court to enjoin creditor's
attempt to collect a pre-petition debt, and the bankruptcy court
refused. The Fourth Circuit upheld debtor's position, ruling that
any reaffirmation not expressly approved by the bankruptcy court
is a nullity. Debtor, moreover, never acts in bad faith by merely
failing to advise the bankruptcy court of reaffirmation.9 9 Creditor,
95. Id. at 410; cf. In re Dahlin, 94 Bankr. 79 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988). The divorce court in
Dahlin awarded a woman one-half of her husband's military retirement as alimony. The
retirement pay was paid directly to husband. Wife asserted that husband had not paid her
half to her, and that this debt was non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(4) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Dahlin, 94 Bankr. at 80-81. The bankruptcy court agreed, holding that the
divorce decree created an express trust in favor of the wife on which the husband had de-
faulted, such default was a defalcation by a fiduciary within the meaning of section
523(a)(4). The court also held that the debtor owed non-dischargeable alimony under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). Id. at 81-82.
96. See generally Morris & Ulrich, Reaffirmation under the Consumer Bankruptcy
Amendments of 1984: A Loser for All Concerned, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111 (1986).
97. Id. at 111-16.
98. 851 F.2d 738 (4th Cir 1988).
99. The bankruptcy court held that the debtor was estopped to assert his discharge be-
cause he had not brought the reaffirmation to the court's attention at the discharge hearing.
The district court reversed. It held that ordinarily a reaffirmation not approved at the dis-
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however, could have appeared at the discharge hearing and
brought the matter to the court's attention.
100
In re Brown'' presents the case of a debtor who asked the court
for permission to reaffirm a debt in an effort to obtain her fresh
start. The debt was to her credit union. The credit union had a
firm policy that it would refuse to deal with anyone who used
bankruptcy to discharge a debt to it. Ignoring her attorney's ad-
vice,102 the debtor asked to reaffirm. Finding that repayment was
not in her best interest, the court refused to permit the reaffirma-
tion but enjoined the credit union from discriminatorily refusing to
deal with Ms. Brown solely because she had discharged a debt
owed to it. Such a policy discriminated against a bankrupt con-
trary to section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code.'0 3 There is contrary
circuit court authority.
0 4
V. BANKRUPTCY'S IMPACT ON FORECLOSURE OF A RESIDENCE
The filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stays' 05 a
pending foreclosure on the family home. Chapter 7, however, offers
no method to save the home.106 In contrast, Chapter 13 permits the
debtor to develop a method to save the home. Section 132217 pro-
vides that the debtor may cure pre-petition defaults and reinstate
the original mortgage contract by successfully completing an ap-
proved Chapter 13 plan.
charged hearing was void, but remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to determine if
the debtor had acted in bad faith by not advising the court of the reaffirmation. Id. at 739.
100. Arnhold overrules In re Newsome, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1000 (Bankr. W.D.
Va. 1980), which held that only the debtor may seek court approval of a reaffirmation. One
wonders, however, whether the creditor's right to appear is of any importance. Even if the
debtor admits the agreement to reaffirm, he can always change his mind. See 11 U.S.C. §
524(c)(4) (1988).
101. 95 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
102. Ms. Brown's lawyer refused to sign the affidavit required by § 524(c)(3) which re-
quires the debtor's attorney to state that the reaffirmation would not impose an undue
hardship upon the debtor. See id. at 36.
103. Id. at 37; see Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58
N.C.L. REV. 723 (1980) (discusses the ultimate scope of section 525).
104. See Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union, 851 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.
1988), and cases cited therein.
105. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
106. A Chapter 7 filing may be helpful to the debtor. See Ulrich, Creditors' Rights: An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 517 (1988), for some of the possibilities.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988).
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Timing is very important. If the foreclosure process is completed
under non-bankruptcy law before the petition is filed, the debtor's
interest in the property terminates, the property does not become
part of the bankruptcy estate, and the automatic stay has no ef-
fect. 08 When is the foreclosure process completed? In re Cole
holds that the process is completed when "the hammer falls," that
is, when the trustee of the deed of trust accepts the buyer's bid
and payment.109 Cole rejects the view that the trustee must also
have completed the deed of sale to the buyer. 10
Assuming that the debtor files a bankruptcy petition before the
foreclosure is completed, under what circumstances may the mort-
gagee foreclose? In re Sensabaugh"' presents one clear situation
- the failure to make several payments under the Chapter 13
plan. The debtor's material breach of her own plan entitled the
creditor to dismiss the Chapter 13, thereby terminating the stay.
The debtor did not challenge the mortgagee's motion directly; in-
stead she filed a subsequent motion to modify her plan post-confir-
mation. The court responded that it would decide the creditor's
motion first." 2 "To do otherwise would allow a circumvention of
section 1307(c)(6) by allowing a debtor to thwart a motion to dis-
miss for a material default by modifying [the] plan post-
confirmation. ''"
3
In Sensabaugh, the court dismissed the Chapter 13 petition, per-
mitting foreclosure in state court to proceed. In most situations,
the creditor will seek an order modifying the automatic stay to
permit foreclosure during the continuation of the bankruptcy case.
108. See, e.g., Abdelhaq v. Pflug, 82 Bankr. 807 (E.D. Va. 1988).
109. 88 Bankr. 763 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
110. In re Rolen, 39 Bankr. 260 (W.D. Va. 1983). Cole also states that the buyer or mort-
gagee's knowledge that the mortgagor's bankruptcy is imminent has no impact on the valid-
ity of the sale. See 88 Bankr. at 764.
111. 88 Bankr. 95 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
112. Id. at 96. Once the cases were dismissed, the debtor's motion became meaningless.
113. Id. In the alternative the court held that the debtor's proposed modification altered
the mortgage contract in a manner not permitted by the Bankruptcy Code. Id. (construing
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)).
Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code was enacted to prevent debtors from altering
the contract terms of home mortgages in Chapter 13. In re Brown, 91 Bankr. 19 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1988) presents a case in which the court used this provision against a creditor.
Debtor filed a Chapter 13 plan for the purpose of curing pre-petition defaults on her resi-
dential mortgage. The plan restored the parties to their position under the mortgage. Al-
though the mortgage did not provide for interest on late payments, the mortgagee claimed it
was entitled to interest on the arrearages. The bankruptcy court responded that awarding
interest would be an alteration of the mortgage contract under § 1322(b)(2), and could not
be awarded. 91 Bankr. at 22-23.
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Automatic stay modification orders are commonly issued. Because
the debtor's residence remains part of bankruptcy estate until the
debtor is divested of all interest in the property, the bankruptcy
court retains jurisdiction to set aside the sale.114
When, if ever, should a bankruptcy court upset a state foreclo-
sure sale following the entry of an order modifying the bankruptcy
automatic stay? In In re Hood,"5 the debtor challenged the fore-
closure sale on the sole ground that the price obtained was less
than the appraised fair market value. The debtor argued that the
rationale of the well-known Durrett"6 decision, which held that a
pre-petition forced sale for less than 70% of the optimum fair mar-
ket value should be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance, should be
extended to this situation. The court refused to extend 17 Durrett,
holding that a foreclosure sale properly conducted under state law
would be affirmed despite the low price and consequent harm to
the estate.1 "
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
115. 92 Bankr. 648 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
116. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). The 1984 amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code seemingly codify Durrett. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (Supp. II
1984).
117. Durrett involved a pre-petition sale, while Hood involved a post-petition sale to
which section 548 clearly does not apply.
118. 92 Bankr. at 656.
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